Abstract. Bit commitment plays an important role in modern cryptography and is utilized widely in protocol design. In this paper, we propose a quantum bit commitment scheme which is statistically binding and perfectly concealing. The security of this scheme is based on the existence of quantum one-way functions by fundamental principles of quantum physics. Relationship of this proposed scheme to Mayers-LoChau no-go theorem on quantum bit commitment is analyzed and the conclusions show that our scheme can evade the no-go theorem.
Introduction
Bit commitment is one of the most fundamental cryptography primitives in modern cryptography, which is widely used for zero knowledge protocols, oblivious transfer scheme, multiparty secure computation, and coin flipping over the phone. A bit commitment protocol involves two parties, a sender called Alice and a receiver called Bob. Suppose that Alice has in mind a bit which she would like to commit to Bob. That is, Alice commits a value to Bob so that she can't change it at a later time. For Bob, at this time, he shouldn't be able to know the committed bit, but can reveal it later at a right time.
Various quantum bit commitment schemes [1] (QBC) have been proposed and BCJL [2] bit commitment scheme has been claimed to be provably unbreakable. Unfortunately, it was shown independently by Mayers [3] , Lo and Chau [4, 5] that all proposed QBC schemes are insecure because the sender Alice can always cheat successfully by so-called EPR attack and delay her measurement until her opening the commitment. The failure of quantum bit commitment is a great surprise and a big lesson for quantum cryptography. However, it is possible to construct computationally secure quantum bit commitment scheme based on quantum one-way permutation [6] . The resulting scheme still requires the computational assumption as in the classical case. In this paper, we show that the unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment schemes exist under any quantum one-way function which is based on quantum mechanics, but not based on computational assumption . We show that the protocol is a statistically binding and perfectly concealing quantum bit commitment scheme. This paper is arranged as below:
Section 2 introduces definitions and preliminaries that we will use in this paper. Section 3 presents a quantum bit commitment scheme, the security of which is based on the fundamental principles of quantum physics. The binding and concealing properties are studied in section 4. Section 5 analyzes the relations of our scheme to Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem on QBC. Section 6 gives conclusions.
Quantum Bit Commitment

Definitions
A bit commitment scheme consists of a commit phase and a reveal phase, in which the sender can commit itself to a value such that the following requirements are satisfied [8] .
1. Concealing condition: At the end of the first phase, the receiver Bob doesn't gain any knowledge of the sender's value. This requirement has to be satisfied even if the receiver tries to cheat.
2. Binding condition: Given the transcript of the interaction in the first phase, there exists at most one value that Bob can later accept as a legal opening of the commitment. This requirement has to be satisfied even if the sender tries to cheat.
When speaking of cheating for bit commitment protocols, both participants can be malevolent. The sender Alice intends to make empty commitment and can alter the value of the committed bit later, while the receiver Bob wants to know the bit before he should do.
For quantum bit commitment model, a system H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C is included, where H A , H B correspond to Alice and Bob's Hilbert space re-spectively and H E corresponds to the environment. Alice and Bob can perform any unitary transformation on their respective systems. They can also introduce new registers, say ancillary registers, in an initial state |0 . Alice and Bob could perform measurements on the quantum state. Suppose that a qubit in state |ψ = α|0 + β|1 is measured according to the {|0 , |1 } basis. To execute a binary outcome measurement, a participant (Alice or Bob) introduces a quantum register in the state |0 and performs a unitary transformation as
Then she (he) sends the second quantum register to a measuring apparatus and outputs the measurement result |ϕ 0 or |ϕ 1 , from which we can deduce that the qubit is in state |0 or |1 . It happens with probability |α| 2 that the measuring result is |0 and |β| 2 that the measuring result is |1 .
Quantum one-way function
In this scheme, we use a class of quantum one-way functions based on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, which are introduced by Gottesman and Chuang [10] and the definitions are presented as below.
Definition 1 (quantum one-way function ). A function
f : |x n 1 → |f (x) n 2 where x ∈ F n 1 2 and n 1 ≫ n 2 ,
is called a quantum one-way function under physical mechanics if (1) Easy to compute: There is a quantum polynomial-time algorithm A such that on input |x outputs |f (x) . (2) Hard to invert: Given |f (x) , it is impossible to invert x by virtue of a fundamental quantum information theory.
What should point out for the above definition is that the condition n 1 ≫ n 2 is necessary. By Holevo's theorem [11] , no more than n classical bits of information can be obtained by measuring n qubits quantum states. Several means to construct quantum one-way function were introduced by Gottesman and Chuang [10] and here we choose the quantum fingerprinting function [12] for the candidate. The quantum fingerprinting function of a bit string u ∈ F n 2 is
where
A quantum bit commitment
Commit phase 1. Alice generates k random strings y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y k , where y j ∈ F n 2 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. She computes k quantum functions for every y j .
We use BB84 encoding method in this step. Alice sets θ = Z and encodes E i (y) using Z basis {|0 , |1 } if she wants to commit b = 0. She sets θ = X and encodes E i (y) using X basis {|+ , |− }(|± = (|0 ± |1 )/ √ 2) if she wants to commit b = 1. In Eq.(3), |Y = |F (x) is a quantum one-way functions introduced in section 2. 2. Alice sends {F (y 1 ), · · · , F (y k )} to Bob.
Reveal phase
1. Alice announces b and the k bits string y ′ 1 , · · · , y ′ k to Bob. 2. Bob computes k quantum functions {F (y ′ 1 ), · · · , F (y ′ k )} using y ′ 1 , · · · , y ′ k . 3. Bob compares F (y ′ j ) with F (y j ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k he received in the first phase by using a so-called quantum swap test circuit (QSTC [12] ).
Security Analysis
The Concealing property
In a bit commitment scheme, concealing means that the receiver Bob can't obtain more than a negligible amount of information about the bit committed by Alice. We say that a scheme is perfectly concealing if the receiver cannot gain any information about the committed bit. It can be easily verified that our protocol is perfectly concealing.
Theorem 1. The quantum bit commitment scheme in section 3.1 is perfectly concealing.
Prrof. Suppose ρ b be the density matrix corresponding to the state sent by Alice when the bit b ∈ {0, 1} is committed. For a quantum function |F (y j ) , Bob can extract information about b only from the last qubit
. From Bob's point of view, E i (x) and b are just random bits. The density matrix of |E i (y j ) (θ(b)) corresponding to Z basis and X basis can be expressed as
Because the first ⌈log 2 m⌉ qubits of ρ 0 and ρ 1 are the same, the states ρ 0 and ρ 1 have the same density matrix and no information about the transformation basis can be obtained from the qubits he received in the first phase. The scheme is perfectly concealing because no quantum measurement can distinguish between two processes that outputs the same density matrix.
The Binding Property
We say that a protocol is binding if Alice can't open both 0 and 1 with non-negligible probability of success. We use the definitions of binding condition proposed in literature [6] . Theorem 2. Suppose S 0 (k) and S 1 (k) are the probabilities that Alice succeeds to reveal 0 and reveal 1 respectively. The quantum bit commitment scheme in section 3.1 is statistically binding and satisfies
where τ (k) is negligible.
Proof. Here we present two strategies that a dishonest Alice can apply. One is that she doesn't introduce quantum entangled state with her kept register and the other is that she constructs a state entangled with some state that she holds.
1. In the first case, a dishonest Alice prepares a quantum state for every y j as
Alice keeps the first register
|e i and sends the second and third registers to Bob. Because Alice's register is entangled with Bob's two registers, if there exists a quantum unitary operation on Alice's qubits which transforms Bob's last qubits in third registers into the state encoded in θ(1 − b) basis, the second register of Bob's will rotate to (×) . So, the states on Bob's side becomes
In the reveal phase, Alice sends y ′ 1 , · · · , y ′ k and 1 − b to Bob. Bob computes the quantum states for every
Because the first ⌈log 2 m⌉ qubits of |F ′ (y j ) and F (y j ) B are encoded in different basis for all y j , (1 ≤ j ≤ k), Bob will reveal Alice's cheating with an overwhelming probability larger than 1 − (
2 ) k . Here, k is a security parameter.
If Alice doesn't introduce entangled states with her kept register, then
she has no quantum register correlated with the qubits on Bob's side. In the reveal phase, she straightly sends y ′ 1 , · · · , y ′ k and 1 − b to Bob. In this case, Bob can reveal Alice's cheating with a probability no less than 1 − (
2 ) k by performing the quantum test circuit on k pairs of the quantum states.
Relations of Our Scheme to No-go theorem
The proposed scheme aims to construct a perfectly concealing scheme which satisfies the "ideal case" requirement (Eq.(3) in reference [4] ), namely
In our scheme, for every y j , we have
Here, the second register is encoded in "+" basis and the last register (including one qubit) is encoded in "θ(b)" basis according to the value of the committed bit b. Alice keeps the first register and sends the last two to Bob.
Three registers in Eq. (9) and Eq.(10) are entangled with each other. If Alice performs a unitary operation on her first register which transforms the third register of Eq.(2) to Eq.(3), the second register of Bob's will change to |i (×)B . The transformation rotates |0 j to |1 ′ j that is equal to |1 j except for the second register. That difference will be detected by Bob using the QSTC. 
An open problem, according to Schmidt decomposition, is whether there exists an operation U ′ acts on the first register of |0 j and rotates the last two registers of |0 j to |1 j in our scheme.
Conclusion
In this article, we present a perfectly concealing and statistically binding quantum bit commitment scheme. The security of it is based on the existence of quantum one-way functions based on quantum information theory, which is different from the quantum one-way functions based on computational assumption utilized by Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [6] . We analysis the relationship of this proposed scheme to Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem on quantum bit commitment and show why our scheme can evade the no-go theorem.
